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Abstract
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between
mobile network operators in the presence of call externalities and net-
work eﬀects. It shows that the regulation of mobile termination rates
based on “long-run incremental costs” increases networks’ strategic in-
centives to ineﬃciently set high on-net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerentials, thus
harming smaller networks and new entrants. The paper argues in fa-
vor of a “bill-and-keep” system for mobile-to-mobile termination, and
presents international evidence in support of this conclusion.
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1 Introduction
The UK telecoms authority (Ofcom) regulates the termination rates of the
four incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) in the UK at “long-run
incremental cost” (LRIC), and it has recently included the new entrant,
Hutchison 3G UK, within this regulatory framework.1 The main rationale
for Ofcom’s regulation of these charges is to prevent a welfare-reducing dis-
tortion in the structure of prices, whereby excessive profits from the exploita-
tion of monopoly power in call termination are used to subsidize subscriber
acquisition costs.2 Indeed, Ofcom’s estimates of the welfare benefits of reg-
ulation (Ofcom 2007a, Annex 19, pp. 387-395) are exclusively concerned
with correcting this ineﬃciency in the structure of prices, which it believes
leads to over-consumption of mobile retail services and under-consumption of
other retail services that use mobile termination, such as fixed retail services
(Ofcom 2006, p. 80).3
Ofcom treats fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile termination charges
symmetrically,4 and its cost model estimates LRIC by allocating the fixed
1Termination rates are the charges that mobile operators levy on fixed network opera-
tors and other mobile operators for terminating calls on their networks. Ofcom (2007a, p.
199) defines "LRIC" as "the additional cost an MNO incurs to provide termination", or
"the cost that the firm would avoid if it decided not to provide voice termination, taking
a long-run perspective". The price caps for the MNOs in the UK are actually set at Of-
com’s estimate of LRIC for each network, plus a markup for common costs and a network
externality surcharge.
2This issue is frequently discussed in terms of the “waterbed” eﬀect, whereby a reduc-
tion (or increase) in termination charges leads to a corresponding increase (or reduction) in
subscription charges to consumers (see Ofcom 2006, pp. 77-85; Ofcom 2007a, pp. 101-115;
and Armstrong and Wright 2007, pp. 13-14). The characterization of mobile call termina-
tion as a “monopoly” assumes that mobile operators can make “take-it-or-leave-it” oﬀers
to fixed-line operators and to each other, which is typically justified by reference to various
interconnectivity obligations. Binmore and Harbord (2005) question this assumption, and
provide an analysis of mobile call termination instead as a bilateral-monopoly bargaining
problem.
3That is, Ofcom does not claim that the MNOs in the UK are earning excessive profits
overall via excessive charges for voice termination (see Ofcom 2007a, pp. 8-9), although it
“remains of the view that the waterbed eﬀect is unlikely to be complete” (Ofcom 2007a,
p. 109). See Genakos and Valletti (2007) for recent empirical evidence on the strength of
the waterbed eﬀect in twenty countries.
4Specifically, the price caps, or “target average charges,” for the two services are set at
and common costs of a hypothetical eﬃcient network operator over mobile
retail and wholesale services.5 We shall argue in this paper that this approach
to regulating termination charges is flawed for a number of reasons, and
that consequently Ofcom’s regulatory policy – by distorting retail pricing
incentives in the mobile market – may be doing as much harm as good.
A first simple point, which has been frequently made elsewhere,6 is that
even in the absence of any strategic eﬀects (which are discussed immediately
below), the regulation of pence per minute (ppm) mobile termination charges
should in principle be based on marginal costs, and not on the fully-allocated
costs estimated by Ofcom’s LRICmodel. Very few, if any, mobile telecommu-
nications costs are traﬃc-sensitive, but they are nevertheless recovered on a
traﬃc-sensitive basis under Ofcom’s approach. To the extent that regulated
termination rates represent fixed costs that are recovered on a per-minute
basis, they are too high, and act to ineﬃciently increase retail call charges
and reduce the number of calls made to mobile networks.
Ofcom is therefore allowing MNOs in the UK to charge termination rates
which are likely to be far in excess of marginal costs.7 A more eﬃcient price
structure would set per-minute rates at or near zero, but possibly allow for
networks to contribute to each others’ capacity costs via capacity surcharges.
If, for most practical purposes, such capacity charges can be expected to net
out, a better regulatory policy is likely to be “bill-and-keep,” under which
the same level. See Ofcom (2007a, pp.404-408).
5See Ofcom (2007a), Annex 5, especially paragraphs 5.11-5.19.
6See, for example, Quigley and Vogelsang (2003) and DeGraba (2003).
7Some compelling evidence for this comes from the fact that MNOs in the UK and
Europe frequently set prices for on-net calls – i.e. calls originating and terminating on
their own networks – much lower than regulatory estimates of their incremental termi-
nation costs. For example, Ofcom’s estimates of LRIC for the incumbent UK operators in
2006 all exceeded 5 ppm, whereas the average price of on-net calls in 2006 was reported to
be 3.5 ppm (Ofcom 2007b, Figure 4.40). Similarly, the Portuguese regulator (ANACOM
2007) has recently estimated that on this basis, termination costs in Portugal are of the
order of C=0.036 per minute, compared to the regulated rate of C=0.11 per minute. See also
the discussion of the French regulator ARCEP (2007), Chapter 4 and pp. 81-82.
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reciprocal termination charges are set equal to zero.8 ,9
Our second point is more complex, and has only recently become clear
as the academic literature on network competition has become increasingly
realistic. It now appears that Ofcom’s regulatory policy is founded on an in-
complete understanding of competitive interaction in mobile markets, which
has led it to focus on one potential distortion in relative prices at the expense
of others. Its LRIC-based price regulation is consequently contributing to
another welfare-reducing distortion of prices – oﬀ-net versus on-net price
discrimination – which is particularly damaging to new entrants and to
competition from smaller networks. By focusing solely on the absolute level
of mobile termination rates, and associated “waterbed” eﬀects, Ofcom’s reg-
ulatory policy may well be damaging competition and reducing welfare in
the mobile market.
It is now widely recognized that new entrants in mobile markets face a
barrier to entry due to the structure of prices charged by incumbent networks.
In particular, on-net versus oﬀ-net price diﬀerentials create tariﬀ-mediated
network externalities, as described by Laﬀont et al. (1998b), which make
larger networks more attractive to consumers than smaller networks. When
on-net calls are priced below oﬀ-net calls, ceteris paribus, subscribers to large
networks experience lower average call charges than subscribers to smaller
networks, since more of their calls are made on-net. This makes larger net-
works more attractive and places smaller networks at a competitive disad-
vantage.
Large price diﬀerentials for on-net and oﬀ-net calls are common in most
European mobile markets. In the UK, according to Ofcom’s own estimates,
the average charge in 2002 was 22.6 ppm for oﬀ-net calls versus 5.1 ppm for
8Quigley and Vogelsang (2003), for example, argue that, “capacity-based interconnec-
tion charges would be ideal, because they would correctly reflect the costs incurred by the
networks,” and note that, “bill and keep is like a two-part tariﬀ in access charges: the
fixed fee equals the own-network costs for termination of the call generated by the other
network, while the variable fee is zero.”
9Armstrong and Wright (2007, p. 14) suggest another reason for excluding fixed and
common costs from regulated termination charges in competitive mobile markets. In the
presence of strong “waterbed” eﬀects, high termination charges will not provide MNOs
with any contribution towards their fixed or common costs, but rather be dissipated in
competition to attract new subscribers.
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on-net calls. Although by 2006 this diﬀerential had been reduced to 8.9 ppm
for oﬀ-net calls versus 3.5 ppm for on-net calls, it remains significant.10 Data
from European countries such as France, Germany and Spain tell a similar
story.11
If networks have roughly equal termination costs, however, economic ef-
ficiency requires equal on-net and oﬀ-net call charges. So why do mobile
operators set large price diﬀerentials for on-net and oﬀ-net calls?12 This is-
sue has recently been addressed in a number of recent papers, including Jeon
et al. (2004), Berger (2004) (2005), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Hoernig
(2007), and Calzada and Valletti (2007), who consider the impact of call ex-
ternalities and network eﬀects on competition and market structure in the
mobile sector. Call externalities refer to the fact that both the sender and
receiver of a call receive a benefit from it, although under a “Calling Party
Pays” (CPP) regime only one party is charged for the call. The importance
of call externalities is beyond doubt, but they have been largely ignored un-
til recently both by the academic literature and by regulatory authorities.
DeGraba (2000, p. 15), for example, notes that:
“the economic analyses of interconnection pricing generally as-
sumed that the calling party is the sole cost-causer and the sole
beneficiary of a call. While these assumptions may have been a
useful means of simplifying the analysis of various interconnec-
tion pricing problems, they have long been recognized as unreal-
10See Figure 4.40 in Ofcom (2007b).
11See Section 4.2 below for further detail; also Armstrong and Wright (2007, pp. 6-7).
As Armstrong and Wright note, it is a complex and largely arbitrary task to give precise
estimates for the prices of the various types of calls and messages originating on mobile
networks, since mobile networks each oﬀer a wide variety of tariﬀs, with diﬀerent monthly
rentals, corresponding to diﬀerent volumes of inclusive call minutes and text messages.
The method of calculation used by Ofcom is not made clear in their documents.
12The academic literature was until recently unable to explain on-net/oﬀ-net price dis-
crimination. This literature – like Ofcom – focused on the exploitation of monopoly
power in setting termination rates to subsidize competition to acquire subscribers. It also
concluded that purely cost-based access (i.e. termination) charges are welfare optimal,
and that consequently fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile termination charges should
be regulated at the same level. See, for example, Armstrong (2002); Wright (2002a); and
Gans and King (2000a).
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istic, and, with the growth of competition in telecommunications,
they need to be reconsidered.”
The inclusion of call externalities in the analysis is of particular impor-
tance, since this has been shown to have significant eﬀects on competition,
the structure of retail prices, and optimal regulatory policy. The main conclu-
sion of the more recent literature is that, in the presence of call externalities,
mobile networks have strong incentives to implement on-net/oﬀ-net price dif-
ferentials due to: (i) high mobile-to-mobile termination charges which exceed
marginal cost; and (ii) their strategic incentives to reduce the number of calls
that subscribers on rival networks receive, reducing the attractiveness of rival
networks, and hence their ability to compete. This literature also finds that:
• large networks charge higher oﬀ-net prices, and create higher on-net/oﬀ-
net price diﬀerentials, than smaller networks. This reduces the attrac-
tiveness of smaller networks, since subscribers to a large network can be
expected to make proportionately more on-net calls than the customers
of a smaller network. Ceteris paribus, subscribers to smaller networks
will experience higher average call charges, placing the smaller network
at a competitive disadvantage;
• high (i.e. above marginal cost) mobile-to-mobile termination charges
can lead to permanent “access deficits” for smaller networks, because
even with a “balanced calling pattern”13 traﬃc between networks will
not be in balance. Call externalities reinforce this eﬀect, since when
large networks set high oﬀ-net prices, subscribers of a smaller network
will also receive relatively few calls; and
• welfare-optimal termination charges should be below the marginal costs
of termination for both fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls, in
order to reduce incentives for on-net/oﬀ-net price discrimination. But
optimal mobile-to-mobile termination charges will typically be lower
than fixed-to-mobile termination charges to take account of the fact
13Where in the absence of tariﬀ diﬀerentials, each subscriber calls every other subscriber
with the same probability.
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that the retail prices of mobile-to-mobile calls are unregulated, and the
greater intensity of competition between mobile networks than between
fixed versus mobile networks.
Thus, Ofcom’s policy of imposing identical “cost-based” rates for fixed-
to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls is unlikely to be optimal, even if we
assume that its LRIC model provides reasonable estimates of the marginal
costs of termination, since both rates should be less than marginal cost, and
by diﬀerent amounts. In any event, as noted above, Ofcom’s methodology
results in termination charges which are evidently far in excess of marginal
termination costs.
“Cost-based” regulation of termination rates is consequently exacerbat-
ing the incentives of MNOs to set oﬀ-net prices in excess of on-net prices,
resulting in welfare losses from an ineﬃcient pricing structure and barriers
to entry and growth for smaller networks. Indeed, it is plausible that high
oﬀ-net call charges are a distortion in the structure of prices potentially as
serious as the distortion in prices that the regulation of mobile termination
charges was designed to repair in the first place (i.e. the subsidy of mobile
subscription via high termination charges), and are particularly damaging to
competition from smaller networks and new entrants.
A move to “bill-and-keep” for mobile-to-mobile termination – as sug-
gested by Berger (2004) (2005), DeGraba (2003) (2004), Littlechild (2006),
Quigley and Vogelsang (2003) and Valetti and Houpis (2005) – would likely
result in a more eﬃcient wholesale and retail price structure, help to eliminate
barriers to entry caused by “tariﬀ-mediated” network eﬀects, and increase
welfare and competition in the mobile market. While Gans and King (2001)
argued that bill-and-keep arrangements can be used to soften retail compe-
tition between mobile networks, and may hence be undesirable, the more
recent literature has shown that when call externalities are taken into ac-
count, this conclusion changes. Indeed, when both parties to a call receive
benefits from it, setting access charges equal to the cost of completing a call
is typically ineﬃcient, and bill-and-keep, by imposing some of the cost of a
call on each network, is more eﬃcient than cost-based termination charges.14
14And as we note in Section 3 below, bill-and-keep can be more eﬃcient than cost-based
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Recent empirical evidence (e.g. Birke and Swann 2006, 2007) confirms
that tariﬀ-mediated network eﬀects play an important role in mobile telecom-
munications, and that inducing network eﬀects via oﬀ-net/on-net price dif-
ferentials has been a successful strategy for incumbent mobile operators in
Europe. According to Birke and Swann (2006), their empirical analysis sup-
ports the conclusion that, “the high price of oﬀ-net calls cannot only be a
result of market power, but can be a significant source of market power, which
can especially be used to preempt entry by new competitors.” These studies
thus provide support for the recent theoretical literature which suggests that
strategically inducing network eﬀects can be a profitable strategy for attract-
ing and maintaining market share, and for preempting entry or retarding the
growth of smaller networks. International evidence from countries where
bill-and-keep has been used in practice also appears to support the conclu-
sion that bill-and-keep arrangements tend to encourage a more eﬃcient retail
pricing structure.
The remainder of this survey paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the recent academic literature on call externalities and competition
between mobile networks, leading to the conclusions noted above, while Sec-
tion 3 considers the theoretical arguments for and against bill-and-keep as
a basis for setting termination charges. Section 4 then discusses some em-
pirical evidence. Section 4.1 describes the recent results of Birke and Swann
(2006)(2007), who attempt to quantify the extent of oﬀ-net/on-net price dis-
crimination in the UK and other countries, and its eﬀects on consumers’
subscription behavior. Section 4.2 describes some international evidence on
prices, usage and penetration levels in bill and keep countries compared to
countries with relatively high termination rates. Section 5 concludes.
termination charges even when traﬃc between networks is not in balance, contradicting
the widely-held view that bill-and-keep arrangements are only appropriate when traﬃc
between networks is balanced.
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2 Call Externalities and Competition Between
Networks
As noted above, the academic literature on network competition was until
recently unable to explain the large price diﬀerentials for on-net and oﬀ-net
calls observed in most European mobile markets. The standard conclusions
were that purely cost-based access (i.e. termination) charges were welfare
optimal, and that consequently fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile termi-
nation charges should be regulated at the same level.
These conclusions have now been overturned in a number of recent papers
which consider the eﬀects of call externalities and network eﬀects on com-
petition and pricing in mobile markets. The inclusion of call externalities in
the analysis has been found to have significant implications for welfare and
optimal regulatory policy. As Armstrong and Wright (2007) have noted, “it
is beyond doubt that call externalities are significant, since why else would
anyone leave their mobile phone on to receive calls?” What wasn’t clear un-
til recently was the significance of call externalities for the analysis of price
discrimination and competitive interaction in mobile markets.
This section summarizes the results of a number of recent papers which
analyze the interaction of call externalities with pricing and competition
in mobile networks, including Jeon et al. (2004), Armstrong and Wright
(2007), Hoernig (2007), Calzada and Valletti (2007), and Cambini and Val-
letti (2007). The key conclusions of this analysis are that call externalities
create a strategic motive for oﬀ-net/on-net price discrimination which can
lead to socially ineﬃcient tariﬀ structures, and create an entry barrier for
small networks which are unable to profitably replicate incumbents’ pricing
strategies. Further, high mobile-to-mobile termination rates, coupled with
high charges for oﬀ-net calls, can be used strategically by incumbent oper-
ators to either prevent entry or reduce competition from new entrants into
their markets.
Jeon, Laﬀont and Tirole (2004) Jeon et al. (2004) analyze competition
between two symmetric communications networks which compete in nonlin-
ear prices, and in which both senders and receivers of calls benefit from them
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– i.e. in the presence of call externalities. Specifically, they assume that a
sender obtains a gross surplus u (q) from a call of length q, while the receiver
obtains a surplus of eu (q) = βu (q), where β > 0 is a measure of the strength
of the call externality. Each network i charges its subscribers a fixed fee
Fi, and per-unit call charges p∗ii for on-net calls and p
∗
ij for oﬀ-net calls, for
i, j = 1, 2 .
Jeon et al. (2004) show that, with “network-based price discrimination”
(i.e. when firms are allowed to set diﬀerent prices for on-net and oﬀ-net calls),
each firm fully internalizes the call externalities on its own network, and sets
an on-net price equal to marginal cost less a factor which depends upon the
size of the call externality. By contrast, because oﬀ-net call charges aﬀect
the welfare of consumers on the rival network, they are subject to strategic
manipulation.
Specifically, when cO is the marginal cost of originating a call and cT is
the marginal cost of terminating a call, the profit-maximizing on-net price
for network i is equal to the social-welfare-maximizing price,
p∗ii = cO + cT − eu0 (q(p∗ii)) . (1)
Since each firm has a monopoly in the market for on-net calls on its own
network, it uses the eﬃcient on-net call price p∗ii to maximize the total surplus,
and the fixed charge Fi to extract consumer surplus. Hence, both networks
choose the same on-net price regardless of their market shares, and on-net
calls are priced below total marginal cost.
Noting that in equilibrium eu0 (q(p∗ii)) = βp∗ii, equation (1) may be rewrit-
ten as
p∗ii =
cO + cT
1 + β
. (2)
Thus in the absence of a call externality (i.e. when β = 0), on-net prices for
each network are set equal to marginal cost, and always exceed zero for any
finite value of β.
By contrast, given that network i has market share αi, the profit-maximizing
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oﬀ-net price for network i is given by15
p∗ij =
(
(1−αi)(c0+a)
1−αi(1+β) for αi <
1
1+β ,
+∞ otherwise,
(3)
where a is the reciprocal mobile-to-mobile termination access charge, which
is assumed to be equal for the two networks. Note that from (3),
∂p∗ij
∂αi
> 0.16
Hence a larger network charges a higher oﬀ-net price, and has a higher oﬀ-
net/on-net price diﬀerential, than a smaller network.
In a symmetric equilibrium, when αi = αj = 12 , the profit-maximizing
oﬀ-net price is given by
p∗ij =
½ c0+a
1−β for 0 ≤ β < 1,
+∞ for β ≥ 1, (4)
for each network. In the absence of a call externality (when β = 0), the oﬀ-
net price is equal to cO+a and the on-net price to cO+cT : the on-net/oﬀ-net
price diﬀerential is therefore completely determined by a− cT , the diﬀerence
between marginal termination costs and the termination access charge.17
When the call externality is taken into account, however, strategic con-
siderations change this result. The call externality creates strong incentives
for each firm to increase its oﬀ-net price in order to reduce the number of
calls made to the rival network, thereby reducing the attractiveness of the
rival network to subscribers. Further, when the receiver of a call benefits as
much as, or more than, the sender (i.e. when β ≥ 1), this leads to what Jeon
et al. (2004) refer to as a “connectivity breakdown,” where both networks
set oﬀ-net call charges so high as to eliminate oﬀ-net calling altogether. In-
tuitively, a network’s profitability is determined by the attractiveness of its
15Equation (3) is obtained by maximizing network i ’s profit with respect to pij for a
given market share, adjusting the fixed charge to keep its market share constant when
it changes its oﬀ-net price, and then using the fact that p∗ij = u
0 ¡q(p∗ij)¢ to obtain the
equilibrium price.
16Specifically,
∂p∗ij
∂αi =
(c0+a)β
[1−αi(1+β)]2 .
17De Bijl and Peitz (2002, ch. 6.4) also solve for the equilibrium pricing structure with
two-part tariﬀs and price discrimination in the absence of a call externality. As in Jeon
et al. (2004), both on-net and oﬀ-net prices are set equal to marginal cost, and therefore
the on-net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerential is completely determined by the reciprocal termination
charge.
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oﬀer relative to that of its competitor. By allowing oﬀ-net calls, a network
bears the cost of those calls and, if the receivers enjoy a suﬃciently high
surplus from receiving calls, this makes the other network relatively more
attractive.18
In less drastic cases, when β < 1, competition for market share leads
to “suboptimal connectivity.” That is, oﬀ-net prices which result in too few
oﬀ-net calls being made relative to the welfare optimum. This can be seen
from the fact that the social-welfare-maximizing oﬀ-net price is equal to the
on-net price in equation (1). From (4), two factors potentially increase the
firms’ oﬀ-net prices above the first-best value: the access charge a, and the
call externality eﬀect represented by β. Comparing equations (2) and (4) it
is clear that, even when the reciprocal termination charge a is set equal to
marginal cost cT , equilibrium oﬀ-net call charges still exceed the eﬃcient level
due to the strategic eﬀect induced by the presence of the call externality.19
Armstrong and Wright (2007) Armstrong and Wright (2007, Section
3) use a similar set-up to that of Jeon et al. (2004),20 to analyze pricing and
termination charges in an oligopolistic market which includes both mobile
and fixed networks. In contrast to Jeon et al. (2004), however, they assume
that the receiver of a mobile-to-mobile call of length q obtains a surplus
b · q, where b > 0 is the measure of the strength of the mobile-to-mobile
call externality; and the receiver of a fixed-to-mobile call of length q obtains
a surplus B · q, where B > 0 is the measure of the strength of the fixed-
to-mobile call externality. Therefore, Armstrong and Wright (2007) restrict
the analysis to linear call externalities which are unrelated to the surplus
obtained by the caller.21
18This result requires that the market is “covered” – i.e. that every consumer subscribes
to a network.
19This can also be seen by noting that
∂p∗ij
∂a =
1
1−β > 1 when β > 0 in (4), so an increase
in the reciprocal termination charge results in an increase in both networks’ oﬀ-net prices
which exceed the increase in the termination charge.
20Both papers build on the model in section 8 of Laﬀont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
21One way of understanding this distinction is to note that Jeon et al. (2004) assume
that the “total surplus” from a call, (1 + β) u (q), is “shared” by the sender and receiver
in proportions 11+β and
β
1+β respectively. Armstrong and Wright (2007), on the other
hand, treat the sender’s utility as being completely urelated to the benefit obtained by the
11
The welfare-maximizing fixed-to-mobile call price in the set-up of Arm-
strong and Wright (2007) is given by
P ∗ = C + cT −B, (5)
where C is the marginal origination cost of the fixed network. That is,
the fixed-to-mobile price should equal the total marginal cost of a fixed-to-
mobile call less the relevant call externality. As in Jeon at al. (2004), the
profit-maximizing on-net price for network i is equal to the social-welfare-
maximizing call price, which is given here by
p∗ii = cO + cT − b, (6)
or the mobile network’s on-net marginal cost adjusted downwards to reflect
the call externality its subscribers enjoy from being called by people on the
same network.
By contrast, in a symmetric equilibrium, each mobile firm sets its profit-
maximizing oﬀ-net price equal to
p∗ij = cO + a+
1
n− 1b, (7)
where a is again the reciprocal termination charge, and n is the number of
mobile firms. This exceeds the welfare-maximizing price given by equation
(6), and is equal to a network’s marginal cost for an oﬀ-net call adjusted
upwards to reflect the fact that when a network’s subscribers make fewer calls
to subscribers of other networks, the utility of subscribers to other networks
is reduced because of the call externality. As Armstrong and Wright (2007,
p. 18) note, “this represents the chief anti-competitive motive to set high
oﬀ-net call charges.”
Although the qualitative eﬀect of call externalities on the networks’ mobile-
to-mobile prices is the same as in Jeon et al. (2004), because of the diﬀerent
assumptions on the nature of the call externality the model of Armstrong
and Wright (2007) never leads to infinite oﬀ-net mobile-to-mobile prices and
“connectivity breakdown.”22 As in Jeon et al. (2004), however, setting the
receiver.
22Although for a large enough externality parameter, b, it can predict negative on-net
prices.
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reciprocal mobile-to-mobile termination charge equal to marginal cost, i.e.
a = cT , does not lead to eﬃcient oﬀ-net prices, and does not eliminate on-
net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerentials.
Both models thus predict that the observed diﬀerences in on-net and
oﬀ-net call charges are not solely due to mobile-to-mobile termination rates
which exceed marginal cost . Rather, networks set high oﬀ-net prices in order
to reduce the number of calls received by subscribers on rival networks, thus
reducing the rival networks’ ability to compete.23 Mobile-to-mobile oﬀ-net
prices are distorted away from their welfare-maximizing levels by both the
regulated mobile-to-mobile termination rate a, and by the “strategic eﬀect,”
which in the model of Armstrong and Wright (2007) is represented by the
term 1n−1b in equation (7).
When the prices of fixed-to-mobile calls are regulated at cost (so that
P = C+A), as they have been until recently in the UK for example, from (5)
the optimal fixed-to-mobile termination charge in Armstrong and Wright’s
model is given by
A∗ = cT −B, (8)
i.e. the mobile networks’ marginal cost of termination less the fixed-to-mobile
call externality. In the absence of regulation, but assuming that fixed net-
works and mobile networks are not viewed as substitutes for each other by
consumers, the optimal fixed-to-mobile access charge is still given by (8).
This is because, when fixed and mobile networks are not substitutes, fixed
networks have no strategic motive for setting fixed-to-mobile call prices above
marginal cost, so long as they are able to extract consumer surplus via fixed
fees.24 Hence, setting the fixed-to-mobile access charge according to (8) is
23See Armstrong and Wright (2007, pp. 18-19) for a discussion.
24Using world data on mobile penetration rates, Gruber and Verboven (2001a) and Anh
and Lee (1999) find that fixed and mobile telephony are largely viewed as complements by
consumers. In contrast, using penetration data for the European Union from 1991-1997,
Gruber and Verboven (2001b) find a substitution eﬀect between fixed and mobile phones.
Cadima and Barros (2000) and Sung and Lee (2002) report analogous results using data
from Portugal and Korea respectively. Gans, King and Wright (2005) hypothesize that
the conflicting results may be due to the fact that fixed and mobile phones were initially
complements, but as mobile penetration has increased, they are increasingly being viewed
as substitutes. See also Andersson et al. (2006).
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likely to be approximately optimal even in the absence of regulation of fixed-
to-mobile retail prices.
The welfare-maximizing mobile-to-mobile termination rate, which sets
oﬀ-net charges equal to on-net charges (i.e. p∗ij = p
∗
ii), is given by
a∗ = cT −
n
n− 1b. (9)
Hence, when B = b, the welfare-maximizing fixed-to-mobile termination rate
A∗ exceeds the welfare-maximizing mobile-to-mobile rate a∗, and only as n
becomes large does this diﬀerence vanish.25 Welfare-maximizing mobile-to-
mobile access charges need to be lower than fixed-to-mobile access charges to
oﬀ-set the strategic motive for setting mobile-to-mobile oﬀ-net charges which
are too high relative to their first best levels, and these strategic motives are
largely absent for fixed network firms.
As in Berger (2005) and Gans and King (2000b), Armstrong and Wright
(2007) also show that, if mobile networks are able to coordinate on reciprocal
termination charges, they will choose a mobile-to-mobile termination rate be-
low marginal cost, in order to relax competition for subscribers. The reason
is that, from equation (7), a higher termination charge makes oﬀ-net calls
more expensive than on-net calls, and the mobile market then exhibits posi-
tive network eﬀects, in the sense that subscribers will prefer to join a larger
network. This intensifies competition between networks for market share,
and reduces profits. Agreement on a low reciprocal termination charge re-
sults in oﬀ-net prices which are below on-net prices, so subscribers will prefer
to join a smaller network, which relaxes retail-market competition.26
Armstrong andWright (2007, pp. 16-17), however, note an anti-competitive
motive for large networks to prefer high termination charges when facing
the threat of entry by smaller networks, vis. that "high mobile-to-mobile
25It is not easy to think of a good reason for the call externality parmeters to be diﬀerent
for the two types of network. Hence, B = b appears to be a reasonable assumption.
26The prediction that mobile networks should agree on low mobile-to-mobile termination
charges contrasts sharply with what these firms actually do in practice, however, casting
considerable doubt on the ability of mobile networks to coordinate on profit-maximizing
termination rates. As Armstrong and Wright (2007, p. 20) put it, “it is by no means
clear that unregulated networks do actually negotiate over their mutual MTM termination
charges.”
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termination charges may deter entry." By setting mobile-to-mobile termina-
tion rates above cost, incumbent mobile networks can induce network eﬀects
which make entry less attractive for newcomers. In particular, high termi-
nation rates result in higher prices for oﬀ-net calls, which harms smaller
networks since most of their subscribers’ calls will be made oﬀ-net. Call ex-
ternalities reinforce this eﬀect: when the incumbent networks set high oﬀ-net
prices, subscribers of smaller networks will receive relatively few calls, thus
reducing the utility from joining a smaller network. This is a theme which
has been taken up by Hoernig (2007) and Calzada and Valletti (2007).
Hoernig (2007) The argument that high oﬀ-net prices can be used to
create network eﬀects which reduce the competitive threat posed by smaller
networks is developed in Hoernig (2007), who analyzes the duopoly model of
Jeon et al. (2004) with asymmetrically-sized networks. He assumes that the
termination charge is set by the regulator, and analyzes Nash equilibria with
price discrimination between on-net and oﬀ-net calls, for both linear and two-
part tariﬀs. He also considers the possibility that the larger network engages
in a form of “predatory pricing,” whereby it leverages the tariﬀ-mediated
network externality to reduce the profits of the smaller network.
Hoernig (2007) finds that both asymmetries in network size and call ex-
ternalities have strong eﬀects on the equilibrium on-net and oﬀ-net prices,
and the resulting price diﬀerentials. Specifically, the large network charges
higher oﬀ-net prices, and creates a higher on-net/oﬀ-net diﬀerential, than
the smaller network, in order to improve its relative competitive position by
making the rival network less attractive. This result can be readily obtained
from equations (2) and (3) above.27
As a result, even with a “balanced calling pattern” – i.e. when each
consumer calls every other consumer with the same probability in the ab-
sence of any tariﬀ diﬀerentials – the traﬃc between the two networks will
27One way of explaining this is that with call externalities, an increase in a network’s oﬀ-
net price has a first-order eﬀect on the attractiveness of the rival network for subscribers.
This eﬀect is greater for larger networks, because larger networks have more subscribers
who call the subscribers of the other network and generate a call externality for them.
In other words, with call externalities, receiving calls from the other network is relatively
more important for the smaller network’s subscribers.
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not be in balance, because the number or the duration of calls is aﬀected
by the diﬀerent prices charged by the two networks. Therefore, when the
reciprocal access charge is above marginal cost, the smaller network will in-
cur a permanent access deficit due to its lower oﬀ-net price. Hoernig (2007)
shows that this result holds under both linear and two-part tariﬀs. With
linear tariﬀs the larger network also charges a higher on-net price, while with
two-part tariﬀs both firms set the on-net price at the socially eﬃcient (and
profit-maximizing) level.
But Hoernig (2007) argues that a large network is capable of further harm-
ing the small network by adopting an anti-competitive, predatory-pricing
strategy aimed at inducing the smaller network to exit the market. By in-
creasing its oﬀ-net price above the Nash equilibrium level, the large network
can further reduce the smaller network’s access revenue (if access is priced
above cost), and the call externality enjoyed by the small network’s cus-
tomers.
Hoernig considers both “full predation” which, by choosing arbitrarily
low on-net prices and high oﬀ-net prices, allows the large network to drive
the market share and profits of the smaller network to zero; and “limited
predation,” which instead of provoking immediate exit restricts the small
firm’s profits and cash flows, making it more diﬃcult for it to invest in either
customer retention or improvement of its network.
In either case, predation involves a larger on-net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerential
by the large network. As the author stresses, call externalities are crucial for
this result. In the absence of a call externality, the on-net/oﬀ-net diﬀeren-
tial is driven by the access charge. By contrast, in the presence of the call
externality, this diﬀerential is also driven by the diﬀerence in market shares
between networks and by strategic motivations.28
Calzada and Valletti (2007) While Hoernig (2007) assumes that termi-
nation charges are set by the regulator, Calzada and Valletti (2007) consider
whether networks can strategically coordinate on reciprocal access charges
28Another way of saying this is that in the absence of call externalities, high oﬀ-net
prices on the larger network have no eﬀect on the utility of subscribers to the smaller
network, by definition, since these subscribers do not care about receiving calls.
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in order to reduce competition and entry in their market. They consider
a multi-firm industry in which the incumbent networks negotiate termina-
tion rates which apply to all firms, including new entrants, and allow for
network-based price discrimination. Since the firms’ profits are not neutral
with respect to the industry-wide termination charge, the incumbent opera-
tors recognize that the level of the access charge aﬀects ex post profitability,
and thus the attractiveness of entry ex ante. Calzada and Valletti (2007) iden-
tify circumstances in which incumbents will want to distort access charges
away from the eﬃcient level in order to deter the entry of potential rivals.
For a given fixed cost of entry, incumbent firms may decide to accommodate
entry, accommodate only a subset of entrants, or deter entry altogether.
As observed by Armstrong and Wright (2007) (discussed immediately
above), Calzada and Valletti (2007) show that when the incumbents do not
face entry threats, they will agree on below-cost termination rates. Under
the threat of entry, however, the incumbent networks may choose to set an
ineﬃciently high access charge which deters the entry of potential rivals into
the industry. The reason, as noted, is that a high access charge reduces the
entrant’s profits ex post, reducing the attractiveness of entry into the market.
Calzada and Valletti (2007) note that, “whenever incumbents increase the
access charge above cost in order to deter entrants, they introduce allocative
distortions for calls, as the oﬀ-net price is set above marginal cost. This
behaviour also limits the gains from entry for consumers.”
Call externalities – which Calzada and Valletti model by assuming that
groups of people that tend to call each other more often join the same network
– further increase incumbents’ incentives to coordinate on a high access
charge in order to deter entry. The reason is that a high access charge makes
it less attractive for an incumbent network’s subscribers to join an entrant
network, because doing so means that a larger fraction of their calls will be
made oﬀ-net. Call externalities of this type imply that the entrant suﬀers
more from any mark-up of the access price, while the incumbents suﬀer less.29
29Atiyah and Dogan (2006) (see also Calzada and Valletti 2007, pp. 2-3), discuss the
example of the Turkish mobile industry, where the incumbent duopolists (Turkcell and
Telsmin) agreed to low reciprocal access charges until March 2001, but then they sharply
increased their termination rates from 1.5 eurocents/min to 20 eurocents/min, when faced
with the prospect of entry by two new operators (Aria and Ayacell). After struggling to
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Internalizing Call Externalities? Despite their prominence in the recent
theoretical literature, call externalities have been largely ignored by European
regulatory authorities to date.30 During the last Competition Commission
inquiry in the UK, Ofcom suggested that call externalities did not justify any
adjustment to termination charges because
“it was possible that call externalities were already largely inter-
nalized as people tended to be in stable calling relationships with
each other. The caller might be prepared to make a call even if his
expected benefit was less than the price, because he expected that
a further call (or calls) would be generated, initiated and paid for
by the other party, from which he would receive a benefit without
having to pay.”31
The empirical basis for these assertions is unclear, however. In any event,
the strategic incentive to engage in oﬀ-net/on-net price discrimination dis-
cussed above depends primarily upon the existence of receiver benefits from
receiving calls, which is not in dispute, and less upon the degree to which
the associated externalities may be internalized by people in stable calling
relationships. Therefore, even if call externalities are partially or fully inter-
nalized, to the extent that a call to a subscriber on a rival network benefits
the receiver, a network still has a strategic incentive to set ineﬃciently high
reach profitability, the two new operators merged to form Avea in 2003, resulting in a
market structure with only three operators.
30A notable exception is the Portuguese regulator, ANACOM, that has recently im-
plicitly recognized their eﬀects in referring to the “strong network eﬀects” which create
a competitive disadvantage for the smaller network, Optimus, in the Portuguese mobile
market. It further argued that these network eﬀects were being intensified by the large
networks’ on-net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerentiation. See Case PT/2007/0707: “Remedies re-
lated to the market for voice call termination on individual mobile networks in Portugal:
Comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC1.”
31Competition Commission (2003), paras. 8.257 to 8.260. See also Ofcom, Statement on
Wholesale Mobile Voice Call Termination, 2003, D.16, where it states: “Call externalities
– while they almost certainly do exist – probably do not justify any adjustment to call
prices. As noted in Oftel’s Review of the Charge Control on Calls to Mobiles (2001),
and in the CC report, these are likely to be eﬀectively internalised by callers, as a high
percentage of calls are from known parties and there are likely to be implicit or explicit
agreements to split the origination of calls.”
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oﬀ-net prices to reduce the number of calls received by rival networks’ sub-
scribers.
This can be seen in the recent analysis of Cambini and Valetti (2007),
who consider a model of “call propagation” in which each outgoing oﬀ-net call
results in a fraction x of incoming calls. Comparing their results with Jeon
et al. (2004), the authors show that networks will have reduced incentives to
use oﬀ-net/on-net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown
when outgoing and incoming calls are complements, but that oﬀ-net/on-net
price diﬀerentials do not disappear.
Specifically, Cambini and Valetti (2007) find that the profit-maximizing
oﬀ-net price is equal to
p∗ij =
c0 + a− (a− cT )x
1− β(1− x) , (10)
which takes finite values for 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
1−x . This is lower than the oﬀ-net
price obtained by Jeon et al. (2004) (see equation (4) above), showing that
call propagation does reduce a network’s incentive to set high oﬀ-net prices.
Note, however, that even if the termination rate is set equal to marginal cost
(i.e. a = cT ), the strategic incentive to ineﬃciently increase the oﬀ-net price
above marginal costs remains, since equation (10) is higher than cO + cT as
long as x < 1 (which is the empirically relevant case).32
Call propagation, in any event, is not identical to the notion of “internal-
izing call externalities.”33 Suppose instead that individuals in stable calling
relationships fully internalized the call externality, as hypothesized by Of-
com’s quote above, and consider the model of Jeon et al. (2004). Then the
sender of a call acts so as to maximize the total utility of the call, which is
given by (1+β)u (q) when call externalities are fully internalized, and so sets
p∗ij = (1 + β)u
0 ¡q(p∗ij)¢.
32Cambini and Valletti (2007) cite the empirical evidence in Taylor (2004), who in turn
cites the point-to-point demand models of Southwestern Bell and Telecom Canada, which
suggest that “a call in one direction stimulates something like one-half to two-thirds of a
call in return.”
33Taylor (2004, Section 3) sharply distingushes call externalities from what he terms
“the dynamics of information exchange.”
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It is straightforward to show that, in this case, the equilibrium oﬀ-net
price for a network i with market share αi is then given by34
p∗ij =
(
(1−αi)(c0+a)
1−αi(1+ β1+β )
for αi < 11+ β
1+β
,
+∞ otherwise,
(11)
which is also lower than the oﬀ-net price in equation (3) above. Neverthe-
less, a strategic motive to increase oﬀ-net prices above marginal cost remains,
since even if a = cT and αi = 12 the oﬀ-net price in equation (11) is higher
than cO+ cT . Moreover, when market shares are asymmetric a “connectivity
breakdown” can still occur,35 and a large network still has an incentive to
create higher on-net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerentials than a smaller network. The
reason is that, even when call externalities are fully internalized, a large net-
work remains more capable of reducing the utility of a smaller network’s
subscribers, by reducing the number of calls received by each of those sub-
scribers, than vice versa.36
An additional eﬀect occurs if individuals in stable calling relationships
act so as to minimize the total costs of their communication. Then, ceteris
paribus, an increase in network i’s oﬀ-net price results in an increase in in-
coming oﬀ-net calls from network j, which will tend to increase its profits,
whenever a > cT , without reducing the utility of network i’s subscribers. This
creates an additional motive for implementing high oﬀ-net prices when call
externalities are internalized by subscribers to diﬀerent networks who act as
a team. Hence, the degree to which the internalization of call externalities,
or related call propagation eﬀects, reduce networks’ strategic incentives to
engage in on-net/oﬀ-net price discrimination is an empirical question which
is at present far from being resolved.
34This can be obtained by setting the first-order derivative of network i’s profit with
respect to pij equal to zero (see Jeon et al. 2004, p. 105). Since network j’s subscribers
also send more calls to network i when externalities are internalized in this way, profits
from interconnection also increase whenever a > cT . However, this eﬀect has no influence
on the optimal choice of pij by network i.
35By contrast, with symmetric market shares p∗ij = (c0+a)(1+β), which remains finite
for all finite values of β.
36We conjecture that this result would also hold in the model of Cambini and Valletti
(2007) – i.e. that with asymmetric market shares, a larger network would charge higher
oﬀ-net prices than a smaller network, even if x = 1.
20
3 “Bill-and-Keep” versus “Cost-Based” Ter-
mination Charges
An important issue in the access pricing literature, starting with the seminal
work of Armstrong (1998) and Laﬀont et al. (1998a, b), has been whether
reciprocal access pricing agreements can be used as instruments of tacit collu-
sion, and if and how they should be regulated. In particular, several papers
have asked if bill-and-keep arrangements, which correspond to zero access
charges, can actually be anticompetitive. A natural benchmark against which
the welfare eﬀects of such agreements can be evaluated is cost-based access
pricing, which sets access charges equal to marginal cost.
The early literature (Laﬀont et al. 1998a; Armstrong 1998; Carter and
Wright 1999) showed that firms can use above-cost access charges as a mech-
anism to obtain higher profits when they compete in linear retail prices. By
coordinating on high enough access charges, monopoly call prices can be
achieved, and if inter-network traﬃc flows are symmetric, firms do not bear
any burden from the high charges they pay to each other.37 On the basis of
these conclusions, Carter and Wright (1999, p. 24) argued that bill-and-keep
may be the second-best regulatory policy when the first-best (i.e. marginal
cost pricing) is unobtainable.
Subsequent papers have extended the analysis in several directions and
have shown that networks may wish to agree on interconnect prices below
marginal cost if: (i) networks compete in two-part tariﬀs with discrimina-
tory prices (Gans and King 2001), or (ii) demand for subscription is elastic
(Dessein 2003; Schiﬀ 2002). Gans and King (2001) showed that when the
operators can discriminate between on-net and oﬀ-net calls, below-cost ter-
mination rates can soften downstream price competition, allowing firms to
obtain higher profits. Hence bill-and-keep arrangements may be undesirable
from the consumer’s perspective.38 An opposing position was taken by Cam-
37This collusion result is not robust under more sophisticated pricing strategies, however.
Armstrong (1988) and Laﬀont et al. (1998b) demonstrated that, with two-part retail
prices, the access charge has a neutral eﬀect on profits: any possible access profit would
simply be passed on to customers via a reduction in their subscription fee.
38See also the discussion in Armstrong and Wright (2007). Gans and King (2001) showed
that when firms compete in two-part tariﬀs and discriminatory prices (but without allowing
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bini and Valletti. Valletti and Cambini (2005) showed that networks may
wish to agree on interconnect prices above marginal cost if ex-ante invest-
ments have to be made, in order to weaken competition over investments.
Cambini and Valletti (2003) demonstrated that bill-and-keep arrangements
may be beneficial due to a positive impact on investments in quality prior to
price competition occurring.
All of these papers shared the assumption that only the caller benefits
from a call. Until recently the literature lacked a model of CPP systems
incorporating nonlinear pricing and price discrimination, as well as call ex-
ternalities. As noted above, the inclusion of call externalities in the analysis
is of particular importance, since this has significant eﬀects on competition,
the equilibrium structure of retail prices, and optimal regulatory policy. In-
deed, once it is recognized that both parties to a call receive benefits from
it, it is surprisingly easy to demonstrate that this profoundly changes the
analysis of welfare-optimal prices and termination rates.
DeGraba (2003) In a very simple and general framework, DeGraba (2003)
shows that in the presence of call externalities, access prices equal to a net-
work’s cost of completing a call is typically ineﬃcient. He considers a model
in which the sender of a call obtains a fraction λ of the total utility of the
call, while the receiver obtains a fraction (1 − λ) of the total utility. The
total per-minute cost of a call is c = cO + cT , where, as in Section 2, cO is
the cost of originating a call, and cT is the cost of terminating a call.
DeGraba (2003) argues that a call can be viewed as a public good jointly
consumed by the sender and the receiver, and hence applies the same logic as
in a “Lindhal equilibrium.” Letting pO be the price charged to the sender and
pT the price charged to the receiver, the only prices which result in eﬃcient
for call externalities), both on-net and oﬀ-net prices will be set equal to marginal cost, with
the latter depending upon the wholesale termination rates. When the firms set termination
charges independently (i.e. non-cooperatively), prices are higher than they otherwise
would be, and profits and consumer surplus are lower. When firms set termination charges
cooperatively, however, the negotiated interconnect charge is less than marginal cost,
so each network makes losses on interconnection. This is profitable because it makes
attracting marginal subscribers less valuable, and so price competition is muted. The
profit-maximizing symmetric termination charge may be greater or less than zero. In the
latter case, bill-and-keep may be as close as firms can get to collusive profit maximization.
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consumption and add up to c are
pO = λc and pT = (1− λ)c. (12)
So only in the case λ = 1– i.e. in the absence of call externalities – should
the sender pay for the entire cost of the call.39
If regulation or competition forces networks to charge prices equal to
marginal cost, then the optimal access charge that the network of the sender
of a call should pay to the network of the receiver is equal to
a∗ = (λ− 1)cO + λcT. (13)
Then the eﬀective cost of a call paid by the sender’s network is cO+a∗ = λc,
and the eﬀective cost paid by the receiver’s network is cT − a∗ = (1 − λ)c.
So the optimal access charge is such that each network pays a fraction of the
cost of producing a call equal to the fraction of the value of the call received
by its subscribers. The principle is that when both parties benefit from a
call, they should bear its cost in proportion to the benefit they receive. Only
when λ = 1 is the optimal access charge equal to the termination cost. And
the optimal access charge is equal to zero or even negative if, for example,
λ ≤ 1
2
and cO ≥ cT .40
On the basis of these results, DeGraba (2003) argues that bill-and-keep,
by imposing some of the cost of a call on each network, is more eﬃcient than
cost-based termination charges. DeGraba (2003) also notes that, since the
optimal access charge does not depend on the number of calls originating
on one network as opposed to the other, bill-and-keep is more eﬃcient than
cost-based termination charges even when traﬃc between networks is not in
balance, contradicting the widely-held belief that bill-and-keep arrangements
are only appropriate when traﬃc between networks is balanced. Finally,
another obvious advantage of bill-and-keep is that it is much simpler to im-
plement for the regulator than cost-based termination charges.41
39Eﬃcient consumption will also be achieved if the sender pays λc and the receiver pays
0 (or indeed any price lower than (1 − λ)c), so it is not necessary to introduce charges
for receiving calls to induce consumption eﬃciency. If pT = 0, the “unrecovered” costs
(1− λ)c can be recovered via a fixed fee or subscription charges, levied on either party.
40An access charge equal to zero is also eﬃcient when the marginal cost of a call is zero.
41Wright (2002b) criticizes this conclusion, arguing that bill-and-keep does not solve “the
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Berger (2004, 2005) DeGraba’s simple model is not well-suited to ana-
lyzing competition between networks. By contrast, Berger (2004) analyzes
network competition in linear prices using the standard Hotelling model of
Laﬀont et al. (1998b) in the presence of call externalities. As in the models
discussed in Section 2 above, he shows that call externalities have a signif-
icant eﬀect on competition because, given the access charge, networks set
higher oﬀ-net prices to make subscription to the rival networks less attrac-
tive. Therefore, on-net prices are lower than oﬀ-net prices and, contrary to
the results of Gans and King (2001), cooperatively agreed access charges may
exceed the welfare-optimal charge, even if the cooperatively agreed charge is
below marginal cost.
Building on the model of Jeon et al. (2004), Berger (2005) completes the
analysis by considering optimal access charges in the presence of nonlinear
(i.e. two-part) tariﬀs and call externalities. He shows that the welfare maxi-
mizing termination rate is always less than marginal cost, and quite possibly
less than zero.
This result can be obtained by noting that the eﬃcient oﬀ-net price is
equal to the equilibrium on-net price and, from equation (4), the welfare-
maximizing access charge is equal to
a∗ =
(1− β) cT − 2βcO
(1 + β)
. (14)
Thus the welfare-maximizing access charge is always less than the total
marginal cost of terminating a call cT , and for realistic values of β frequently
negative (e.g. for cO = cT and β > 1/3). Therefore, in contrast to Gans and
King’s result, and corroborating the view of Cambini and Valletti (2003),
Berger (2005) argues in favor of bill-and-keep, showing that such an arrange-
ment is welfare improving compared to cost-based access pricing.
fundamental problem of pricing out network externalities.” Because bill-and-keep excludes
a positive termination charge that may serve to internalize the network externality, Wright
concludes that it often leads to less eﬃcient outcomes. In response to this, DeGraba (2002)
points out that a positive termination charge will typically harm the subscribers of the (e.g.
fixed) network, and may consequently reduce the number of subscribers to this network.
Hence the net eﬀect on welfare of positive termination charges is at best ambiguous, with
both network and call externalities, and must be evaluated empirically.
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Finally, Armstrong and Wright (2007, pp. 20-21) also consider the non-
cooperative setting of termination rates in the presence of call externalities.
Similar to Berger’s results, their analysis suggests that, with two-part tariﬀs
and discriminatory prices, cost-based access pricing can never be optimal
from the social viewpoint, when the call externality is taken into account.
In realistic cases, the optimal access charge is less than zero. It follows that,
from the social viewpoint, bill-and-keep – i.e. a = 0 – is an improvement
over cost-based access pricing.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Market Shares and Network Eﬀects
As mobile networks are highly compatible with each other, the network ef-
fects that exist in mobile markets are primarily induced by the network op-
erators themselves, through oﬀ-net/on-net call price diﬀerentials (these have
been described as “tariﬀ-mediated network eﬀects” by Laﬀont et al. 1998b).
With tariﬀ-mediated network eﬀects, other things being equal, consumers
will prefer to join the network which has the largest number of their calling
partners, and hence large networks are favoured over smaller ones. Some
recent empirical work has attempted to estimate the extent to which tariﬀ-
mediated network eﬀects influence consumer behavior in mobile markets.
Birke and Swann (2006) study mobile network calling patterns and esti-
mate subscription-level network eﬀects using market data from Ofcom and
micro-level data on consumers’ usage of mobile telephones from the survey
Home OnLine. They estimate two classes of models which illustrate the role
of network eﬀects. The first is an aggregate model of the comparative volume
of on-net and oﬀ-net calls which shows that the proportion of oﬀ-net calls
falls as mobile operators charge a premium for oﬀ-net calls.
Figure 1 – taken from Birke and Swann (2006) – shows the actual
development of on-net and oﬀ-net calls from the beginning of 1999 to the
end of 2003. Whereas a roughly equal amount of on-net and oﬀ-net calls
were made at the beginning of the period, the on-net call volume increased
considerably from Q4 1999. For the whole period the percentage of on-net
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Figure 1: Birke and Swann (2006). Development of on-net and oﬀ-net call
volumes. Based on data from Ofcom.
calls is above 50%, which is far higher than the expected percentage that
Birke and Swann (2006) calculated in the absence of any network eﬀects.
Figure 2 – taken from Birke and Swann (2006) – depicts the develop-
ment of the ratio between prices for oﬀ-net calls and for on-net calls. In
early 1999, oﬀ-net calls were about twice as expensive as on-net calls (19
ppm compared to 10 ppm). Two years later, oﬀ-net calls were about five
times more expensive (26 ppm compared to 6 ppm). Afterwards, a decrease
in the price ratio can be observed, but prices for oﬀ-net calls were still about
three times higher in early 2004 (16 ppm compared to 5 ppm).
Birke and Swann’s estimation results indicate that the observed ratio of
oﬀ-net to on-net calls is sensitive to the price premium for oﬀ-net calls, es-
pecially when time lags for consumer inertia and imperfect price information
are allowed for. However they also find that, even in the absence of any price
discrimination between on-net and oﬀ-net calls, a disproportionate number of
calls are on-net, suggesting the existence of a “pure” network eﬀect unrelated
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Figure 2: Birke and Swann (2006). Price-ratio between oﬀ-net and on-net
calls.
to price diﬀerentials.
Their second model analyses the choice of operator by individual con-
sumers. They find that individual subscribers’ choices show considerable
inertia, but are heavily influenced by the choices of the other members of
the same household. There is also some evidence that individual choice of
operator is influenced by the total number of subscribers for each operator.
Birke and Swann (2006) argue that their results provide a strong indica-
tion that network eﬀects play an important role in mobile telecommunica-
tions, particularly on usage patterns of mobile phones and on operator choice.
They suggest that tariﬀ-mediated network eﬀects lead to the coordination of
operator choice, and (Birke and Swann 2006, p. 83):
“the strong reaction from consumers to changes in the price ratio
of oﬀ- and on-net calls suggest that inducing network eﬀects by
operators has been a successful strategy. It can in particular be
used by the incumbent operators to fend oﬀ challenges by new
entrants, such as ‘3’ in the UK and also by any operator gaining
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a lead over the other operators. [...] High termination charges and
high costs for oﬀ-net calls have been regarded in a recent ruling
by the UK regulator OFCOM as being the result of significant
market power that operators have on their individual networks.
As our results suggest, the high price of oﬀ-net calls cannot only
be a result of market power, but can be a significant source of
market power, which can especially be used to preempt entry by
new competitors. If high switching costs are present in mobile
telecommunications, this market power would be highly stable once
consumers have aligned their operator choice even after the price
diﬀerential between on- and oﬀ-net calls has been lowered.”
In a companion paper, Birke and Swann (2007) directly examine provider
choice in mobile networks using class surveys undertaken in the UK,Malaysia,
Italy and the Netherlands. The Netherlands diﬀers from the other countries
in the study in that its mobile operators do not charge diﬀerent prices for on-
net and oﬀ-net calls. They found that the respondents strongly coordinated
on their choice of mobile phone operator if operators induced tariﬀ-mediated
network eﬀects, but not if prices for oﬀ-net calls were the same as prices
for on-net calls, suggesting that coordination and network choice strongly
depends on tariﬀ-mediated network eﬀects, rather than on other factors. In-
terestingly, they found that the degree of coordination for H3G subscribers
in the UK was insignificant when compared to the larger networks such as
Vodafone (Table 6, p. 15). They attribute this to the fact that in 2005, H3G
was the only UK mobile operator that did not charge higher prices for oﬀ-net
calls, but oﬀered packages of calling time regardless of the network to which
calls are made.42
The Birke-Swann studies therefore provide considerable support for the
recent theoretical literature, which suggests the importance of on-net/oﬀ-
42In a related study, Birke and Swann (2005) estimate the importance of tariﬀ-mediated
network eﬀects in mobile telephony, and the impact of the structure of social networks on
consumers’ network adoption decisions, using social network data from a survey of second
year undergraduate students at the University of Nottingham Business School. As in their
other studies, they find that students strongly coordinate their choice of mobile phone
operators, but do this only for operators which charge a price diﬀerential between on-net
and oﬀ-net calls.
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net price discrimination in influencing network choice and calling behavior in
mobile markets. In particular, that strategically inducing network eﬀects can
be a successful strategy for attracting and maintaining market share, and for
preempting entry or retarding the growth of smaller networks.
4.2 International Experience with Bill and Keep
Only a few countries internationally use bill-and-keep, and it tends to be used
selectively. The United States, for example, is “calling party network pays”
(CPNP) for calls to fixed incumbent operators, but is eﬀectively bill-and-keep
for mobile-to-mobile calls and for calls from one non-incumbent fixed provider
to another (or to a mobile operator). In France, bill-and-keep was used for
mobile-to-mobile calls until 2004. Hong Kong has bill-and-keep for mobile-to-
mobile calls whereas mobile networks pay to both send and receive calls from
fixed networks. Singapore uses a U.S.-like system, with bill-and-keep for calls
terminating on the mobile network, but CPNP for calls terminating on the
fixed network. A general conclusion which emerges however, is that bill-and-
keep arrangements lead to low retail prices and very high mobile utilization
rates compared with CPNP countries, with little eﬀect on penetration rates.
Further, with bill-and-keep, incentives for on-net/oﬀ-net price discrimination
are reduced, and in some cases these disappear altogether. So as claimed
above, bill-and-keep arrangements tend to encourage a more eﬃcient retail-
pricing structure.
On-net/oﬀ-net price diﬀerentials Large price diﬀerentials for on-net
and oﬀ-net calls are common in most European mobile markets. In the UK,
pre-pay packages, to which some 65% of customers subscribe, frequently
discriminate between on-net and oﬀ-net calls.43 Typically these price dif-
43A review of operators’ websites in September 2007 provides several examples of this.
O2’s Pay & Go Talk Anytime tariﬀ oﬀered on-net calls at 25 ppm for the first 3 minutes of
a day, and 5 ppm afterwards, compared with an oﬀ-net mobile rate of 40 ppm. T-Mobile’s
“Mates Rates” tariﬀ (its default tariﬀ for new customers), oﬀered on-net calls for 8 ppm,
compared with an oﬀ-net mobile rate of 40 ppm. Orange’s “Magic Numbers” scheme
oﬀered calls at 15p per hour (as opposed to the standard rate of 15 ppm) to 3 nominated
on-net numbers. Of the four incumbent operators, only Vodafone failed to discriminate
between on-net and oﬀ-net calls in its pre-pay tariﬀs, although as noted below, it did
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ferentials are much larger than can be accounted for by mobile-to-mobile
termination charges of approximately 6 ppm. Discrimination is also appar-
ent in the MNOs’ monthly packages.44 Ofcom reports that for the UKmarket
as a whole, average charges for oﬀ-net calls were 8.9 ppm in 2006, compared
with 3.5 ppm for on-net calls, having been as high as 22.6 ppm versus 5.1
ppm in 2002.45
Data from European countries such as France, Germany and Spain tell
a similar story. France’s largest mobile operator, Orange, oﬀers monthly
packages with unlimited on-net call allowances. The second largest operator,
SFR, oﬀers monthly packages with unlimited call allowances to 3 nominated
on-net numbers.46 In Germany, some operators’ tariﬀs oﬀer unlimited on-net
calls.47 And in Spain, the largest mobile operator, Telefonica, oﬀers a pre-
pay tariﬀ which charges 3.3 ppm for on-net calls compared with an oﬀ-net
call rate of 39.9 ppm.48 Other operators also oﬀer on-net call discounts.
By contrast, in countries which have adopted bill-and-keep arrangements
between mobile operators, these diﬀerentials are reduced, or even absent
altogether. In the US and Canada, monthly packages, which are adopted by
the majority of customers,49 tend to oﬀer a fixed monthly minute allowance
for peak oﬀ-net calls, and unlimited minute allowances for both on-net and
discriminate in some of its monthly packages.
44A review of operators’ websites in September 2007 again provides examples. O2’s
more costly Anytime packages oﬀered a fixed minute allowance for peak oﬀ-net calls,
but an unlimited allowance for on-net calls. Vodafone’s Small Business packages oﬀered
unlimited allowances for on-net calls to other business numbers. T-Mobile’s U-Fix packages
oﬀered on-net calls at 10 ppm, compared with an oﬀ-net mobile rate of 35 ppm. Finally,
Orange’s more costly Canary packages oﬀered a fixed minute allowance for oﬀ-net calls
but an unlimited allowance for on-net calls.
45See Ofcom (2007b), Figure 4.40. Ofcom’s estimates of LRIC for the UK operators
in 2006 were approximately 5 ppm for Vodafone and O2, and 5.7 ppm for T-Mobile and
Orange. So the average price of on-net calls in 2006 was significantly below the estimated
values of LRIC.
46Sourced from operator websites: 12 September 2007.
47Annex to the European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2006,
Volume 1, European Commission, 29 March 2007, p. 112.
48“Solid performance, strong trends,” Telefonica, 6 June 2007.
49In Q1 2007, only 15% of customers in the US, and 22% of customers in Canada, were
pre-pay (Global Wireless Matrix 1Q07, Merrill Lynch, 15 June 2007).
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oﬀ-peak calls.50 Pre-pay packages also tend to oﬀer generous or unlimited
minute allowances for both on-net and oﬀ-peak, oﬀ-net calls.51
The situation in Hong Kong and Singapore is very diﬀerent. Pre-pay
packages, which are common,52 tend not to discriminate at all between on-
net and oﬀ-net calls. Most monthly packages also tend not to discriminate
between on-net and oﬀ-net calls.53
France provides a particularly interesting example of the possible relation-
ship between wholesale termination arrangements and on-net/oﬀ-net price
diﬀerentials. Mobile termination is currently CPNP, and as noted above dif-
ferentials are common. However, these diﬀerentials have only emerged since
2005,54 prior to which mobile-to-mobile termination was on a bill-and-keep
basis (see Marcus 2007, Section 4.1.2.2).
Prices and usage The price and usage advantages of bill-and-keep over
CPNP have been noted by a number of commentators. Marcus (2007) ob-
serves that “countries with CPNP systems tend to have higher retail prices
and lower use of mobile service than those with Bill and Keep.” Littlechild
(2006) and Ovum (2006, pp. 78-79) reach similar conclusions.55 Ofcom has
also recognized the advantages of bill-and-keep, noting that it “tends to yields
50In some cases minute allowances are literally unlimited, whereas in others they are so
generous, relative to the minute allowances for peak oﬀ-net calls, that they are eﬀectively
unlimited for most customers.
51Review of operator websites, August 2007.
52In Q1 2007, 66% of customers in Hong Kong, and 40% of customers in Singapore,
were pre-pay, compared with 66% of customers in the UK (Global Wireless Matrix 1Q07,
Merrill Lynch, 15 June 2007).
53Sourced from operator websites: August 2007. Some monthly plans have separate
allowances for on-net and oﬀ-net calls, but the on-net allowances are far less generous
than those seen in the US and Canada.
542006 Annual Report, ARCEP, p. 195, http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=1&L=1.
55Littlechild (2006) compares Receiving Party Pays (RPP) countries with Calling Party
Pays (CPP) countries, noting that “RPP tends to reduce average revenue per minute
and increase average usage without adversely aﬀecting mobile penetration”. However,
while all of the countries he describes as RPP in this context have bill-and-keep wholesale
arrangements, one of them (Singapore) is now CPP, and in two others (US and Canada),
customers can opt for CPP tariﬀs if they wish. Hence Littlechild’s conclusion that bill-and-
keep “has essentially all the beneficial consequences of RPP (for which it has traditionally
been the basis) but oﬀers the prospect of avoiding the downside [i.e. mandatory RPP]”.
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Figure 3: Usage and average retail prices, Q1 2007: bill-and-keep vs CPNP.
Source: Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix 1Q07, 15 June 2007.
significantly higher minutes of use per subscriber” and that “average revenue
per minute is lower.”56 Figure 3 compares usage and average retail prices
between bill-and-keep and CPNP countries.
To summarize, high termination rates tend to lead to high retail prices
for originating calls, and correspondingly lower usage rates. As we might
expect, the higher marginal prices at the retail level tend to depress call
origination due to the price elasticity of demand. It is diﬃcult to avoid the
conclusion that, via the eﬀects identified in this paper, bill-and-keep leads to
more intense price competition and hence lower prices for mobile subscribers.
56Paragraph 6.6, Mobile Call Termination – Market Review, Ofcom, 30 March 2006.
Ofcom reaches its conclusion by comparing the bill-and-keep countries (USA, Canada,
Hong Kong, Singapore and China) with CPNP countries in Europe and elsewhere.
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5 Conclusion
In an extensive review of the economic arguments and empirical evidence
surrounding the “Calling Party Pays” (CPP) versus “Receiving Party Pays”
(RPP) debate, Littlechild (2006) has summarized the arguments in favour of
bill-and-keep in terms of avoiding the “bottleneck monopoly problem:”
“In many countries there is widespread concern at the level
of mobile termination charges. This is attributable to the bottle-
neck monopoly created by the Calling Party Pays (CPP) princi-
ple. It has led to increasingly severe price controls on termination
charges. [...] The Receiving Party Pays (RPP) principle, which
applies in North America and several Asian countries, avoids the
bottleneck monopoly problem. [...] Surprisingly, CPP regulators
have either ignored RPP or rejected it for various alleged dis-
advantages. These do not withstand investigation. However, in
CPP countries there is still concern about the idea of paying to
receive calls.
There is a way to get the benefits associated with RPP without
this disadvantage. RPP is based on a ‘bill and keep’ regime. Some
mobile operators in RPP countries are now oﬀering customers
the option of calling plans with free incoming calls. Changing to
a ‘bill and keep’ regime would avoid the bottleneck monopoly and
associated distortions of conventional CPP regimes, yet enable
operators and customers themselves to choose how to pay for calls
– in eﬀect, to choose between CPP and RPP.”
As we have argued in this paper, in addition to the advantages noted
by Littlechild and others, a move to bill-and-keep also reduces incentives for
ineﬃcient on-net/oﬀ-net price discrimination, which is at least partly respon-
sible for softening price competition and maintaining higher call charges in
the UK and other CPP countries. In addition, by exacerbating MNOs’ incen-
tives to introduce socially ineﬃcient tariﬀ structures, high mobile-to-mobile
termination charges, which make oﬀ-net calls more costly than on-net calls,
create an entry barrier for small networks which are unable to profitably
replicate incumbents’ pricing strategies.
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Some recent related work in a dynamic framework by Cabral (2007a)(2007b)
tends to support these conclusions. Cabral (2007a) considers a dynamic
model of competition between proprietary networks in which consumers die
with a constant hazard rate and are replaced by new consumers. Firms com-
pete for new consumers by oﬀering network entry (i.e. subscription) prices,
which may be below cost. In each period consumers enjoy a benefit upon
joining a network which is increasing in network size during that period.
Cabral studies network pricing decisions and the stationary distribution of
market shares, which depends upon the barrier to entry created by “network
eﬀects”. One source of network eﬀects is the pricing of network services. In
the case of mobile telecommunications, to the extent that operators set dif-
ferent on-net and oﬀ-net prices, the utility from being connected to a given
network will be increasing in the number of other users on the same network.
The equilibrium state in the model is generally asymmetric, since a larger
network is always more likely to attract new subscribers than a smaller net-
work. Indeed, for suﬃciently strong network eﬀects, the market is char-
acterized by “increasing dominance”, (i.e. the larger network increases in
size relative to the smaller network), and diﬀerences in pricing are thus ex-
clusively driven by “market power considerations” related to capturing new
subscribers. Since consumers are willing to pay more to join a larger network,
in equilibrium larger firms charge higher network ‘entry’ prices, i.e. spend less
on subsidizing subscription. Cabral (2007a) uses his model to measure the
barrier to entry caused by network eﬀects, and to estimate long-run market
share asymmetries.57
Cabral (2007b) applies this framework to mobile markets, and shows that
a positive markup on termination charges, in addition to the short run dead-
weight loss from ineﬃcient price discrimination, also implies a higher degree
of increasing dominance in market share dynamics: that is, a greater ten-
dency for larger networks to become even larger. In addition to leading to a
more asymmetric industry structure, steep access charges also increase bar-
riers to entry. Specifically, tariﬀ -mediated network eﬀects decrease the value
57In one of his simulations, Cabral shows that long-run market shares will converge
to 80% for the larger (“incumbent”) network and 20% for the smaller (“new entrant”)
network.
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of an entrant (or a small network), and increase the average time that it
takes for an entrant to achieve a certain given size.
As we have shown in this paper, eﬃcient pricing in mobile networks re-
quires equal on-net and oﬀ-net charges which are below marginal cost, to
correct for the call externality. Hence, optimal termination charges are also
below marginal cost, and the diﬀerence between termination charges and
marginal costs is likely to be larger for mobile-to-mobile charges than for
fixed-to-mobile charges, to compensate for more intense competition between
mobile networks. A move to bill-and-keep for mobile-to-mobile termination
would likely result in a more eﬃcient wholesale and retail price structure,
help to eliminate barriers to entry caused by “tariﬀ-mediated” network ef-
fects, and increase welfare and competition in the mobile market.
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